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Introduction
Block's overriding factual basis for this lawsuit is the City's failure, during two (2)
statutorily mandated subdivision approval processes in 2005 and 2006, respectively, to inform
Block, as property developer and applicant, of a hazardous site condition, namely slope
instability from a landslide that occurred in 1999, which was known to the City and documented
in its subdivision records and which made the site unsuitable for residential development and
use. Without knowledge of the prior landslide and following the City's 2006 approval of the
Canyon Greens subdivision, Block constructed three (3) custom homes on the hazardous site
between 2006 and 2008 at an out-of-pocket cost far exceeding one million dollars only to suffer
the tota110ss of two (2) of those homes and substantial damage to the third home when a 2009
landslide occurred in the same location as the 1999 landslide.
These circumstances show that genuine issues of material fact exist in support of
negligence and gross negligence claims against the City and Cutshaw for breach of their duty of
care. The district court erred as a matter oflaw by concluding (i) that the City owes no duty to
Block, (ii) that City's actions are entitled to immunity or exceptions to liability under the Idaho
Tort Claim Act ("ITCA") and (iii) that Block's claims are barred by the economic loss rule.
Negligence, Generally
In order to establish negligence, Block must prove the existence of each element: "(1) a
duty, recognized by law, requiring a defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting
injuries; and (4) actua110ss or damage." Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 281 P.3d 103,
109 (2012), reh'g denied (Aug. 1,2012).
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The existence of a duty of care is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388,400,987 P.2d 300,312 (1999);

Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247, 985 P.2d 669, 672 (1999). Block argues that the City
owed him a duty under i) general negligence principles, ii) a statutory duty theory, iii) a special
relationship theory, and based on iv) the City's assumption of duty. Block has provided sufficient
evidence to establish a duty of care under each of these theories.
This Court has held that "every person, in the conduct of his or her business, has a duty to
exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Jones v.

Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009, 1012 (2011), Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247,985 P.2d at
672. "Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the circumstances of each case.
Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low
degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required."

Sharp v. W.H Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300-01, 796 P.2d 506, 509-10 (1990).
It was clearly foreseeable that residential construction upon a known landslide area would

result in physical injury and/or property damage if the City did not exercise reasonable care to
prevent such harm and/or damage. The burden upon the City to preserve and timely disclose to
Block the information regarding the 1999 landslide was de minimis, yet the City failed to do so.
Block, as the owner and developer of such land, suffered substantial physical damage to the
homes he built upon the landslide area proximately caused by the City's breach of its duty to
Block.
The City believes it owes no duty to Block because he is a member of the "public at
large." (Respondents' Brief at 9). The City's public duty argument is premised on the assumption
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that Block's negligence claim is based on the City's "acts done prior to Block's purchase of the
property." (Respondents' Brief at 9-10). However, this is not the thrust of Block's negligence
claims. Block's negligence claims are primarily based on the City's actions in connection with
the City's approval of the Canyon Greens subdivision in 2006, after Block had purchased the
property. It was the City's approval of the Canyon Greens subdivision that created the three (3)
building lots upon which the homes on 153, 155 and 159 Marine View Drive were constructed
and, thereafter, damaged by the 2009 landslide. The City has attempted to confuse the Court by
referring to claims related to Block's purchase of the property that are not being asserted by
Block in this appeal. The City seems to concede in a footnote that "[t]o the extent that Block
contends the City owed him a duty after he purchased the property, see Appellant's Brief at 2122, no duty exists to protect from economic loss. See § B, below." (Respondents' Brief at 12, fn.
5). Block's further discussion regarding the district court's misapplication of the economic loss
rule is set forth below.
The City's reliance on Udy v. Custer County is misplaced and actually supports Block's
claim. In Udy, the court concluded that the public entity with exclusive custody and control over
the state highway had a duty to the public for the maintenance of that highway not the county
sheriff. Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 390, 34 P.3d 1069, 1073 (2001). In addition, the
court noted that the county sheriff had not increased the risk associated with the road. !d. In
Block's situation, the City had exclusive control over its subdivision process and Block's
development and the City's breach of its duty contributed to the physical damage to Block's
homes and his substantial out-of-pocket losses.
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Negligence Per Se
The City begins its argument regarding negligence per se by misleading this Court in
asserting that "Block never addressed" (Respondents' Brief at 6) negligence per se arising from
duties imposed by the City Subdivision Ordinance. This statement is not true. First, in his
Complaint, Block pled the City's failure to warn Block of site conditions during the plat approval
process for Canyon Greens subdivision and the City's failure to require or approve a plan to
abate the site conditions. R. Vol. I, pp. 23-25 (Complaint, ~ 55). Further, in opposing the City's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Block made numerous references to his claim of a duty
arising from the City's failure to discharge its responsibilities under Section 32-9 of the City
Subdivision Code. R. Vol. III, pp. 460-62, 466-67, 469-72,522-27,665; R. Vol. IV, pp. 691-93.
Moreover, a party is not required to plead negligence per se when alleging a cause of
action for ordinary negligence. See Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 89899, 188 P.3d 834, 840-41 (2008) (Party is not required to specifically plead negligence per se in
their complaint when alleging a cause of action for ordinary negligence. Thus, Respondents were
not required to amend their complaint as a condition precedent to the district court's
consideration of their request that the jury be instructed as to negligence per se.)
Block argues that a duty arose and was breached under negligence per se principles. "The
effect of establishing negligence per se through violation of a statute is to conclusively establish
the first two elements of a cause of action in negligence." 0 'Guin v. Bingham Cnty., 142 Idaho
49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005) (The elements of duty and breach are taken away from the
jury). Here, Block argues that the City violated two (2) different Lewiston City Ordinances, §§
32-8 and 32-9. R. Vol. V, pp. 882-87,894-95.
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The existence of negligence per se is an issue of law over which this Court exercises free
review. 0 'Guin, 142 Idaho at 51, 122 P.3d at 310. In order for negligence per se to apply, a
plaintiff must show that: (1) the statute or regulation clearly defines the required standard of
conduct; (2) the statute or regulation is intended to prevent the type of harm the defendant's act
or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation
was designed to protect; and (4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at 52,
122 P.3d at 311 (citing Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001)).
The City maintained the photograph and memorandum related to the 1999 landslide in
two different locations in its records with the intent to act upon that information at the
appropriate time. Based on the Subdivision Ordinance, City staff was required to i) discuss
with the developer any site conditions (the 1999 landslide) that may require special
consideration or treatment, ii) identify any unusual problems with the site (the 1999 landslide),
iii) review and discuss with the developer the need for special studies as a result of the site
conditions (the 1999 landslide), and iv) advise the subdivider of the results of the City's
actions. The City did none of these and, in so failing, approved Block's Canyon Greens
subdivision, thereby allowing Block to construct the three (3) homes and proximately causing the
damage to those homes, which, but for the City's approval, would neither have been constructed
nor damaged.
Thus, the facts of this case do establish that all elements of a claim for negligence per se
have been met, the standard of conduct being clearly defined by Subdivision Ordinance § 32-8
and/or § 32-9, which ordinance(s) is/are intended to prevent precisely what occurred to Block as
a subdivision developer and intended beneficiary of the protections of the ordinance(s), and the
violation which proximately caused physical damage to Block's homes.
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The City argues that causation has not been proven, but this is a question of fact and
Block has raised material issues of fact as to this issue through his expert engineer Eric
Hasenoerhl has testified "I concluded that the fault line of the 2009 slope movement that is, the
line from which the slope broke away and moved, is almost identical to the fault line of the 1999
slope movement" and John "Hank" Swift has testified
The City's failure to require a geotechnical evaluation and implement the
recommendations of that evaluation for earthwork and stormwater drainage
facilities in an area where a known landslide had occurred, the City's failure to
supervise and/or inspect development that concealed a landslide, the City's failure
to require proper abatement of a landslide, the City's failure to prevent, restrict or
regulate development in the area of a landslide, the City's failure to act with
ordinary care to protect against the risks ofa landslide, and the City's failure to
warn of a landslide at the time of subdivision of property encompassing such
landslide area and/or at the time the City issued building permits for the affected
property in 2006 and thereafter, contributed to the instability of the property
Block purchased and which instability ultimately caused his damage.
R. Vol. I, p. 118; R. Vol. IV, p. 701.

"[T]o establish liability in a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove a causal connection
between the defendant's breach of duty and the plaintiffs injuries." Allen v. BurggrafConstr.

Co., 106 Idaho 451, 453, 680 P.2d 873, 875 (Ct.App.1984) (citing Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho
617,619 P.2d 135 (1980)). There is sufficient evidence to show the City owed a duty to Block.
Although the district court did not reach the issue of causation, Block has offered sufficient
evidence proving a causal connection between the City's breach of duty and his injuries.
Special relationship
Block had a special relationship with the City which obligated the City to protect him. An
affirmative duty to aid or protect arises only when a special relationship exists between the
parties. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999).
Determining whether a special relationship exists "sufficient to impose a duty requires an

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 11

evaluation of 'the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.'" !d. citing W. Prosser, Law of Torts 333 (3d
ed.l964).
The City's and Block's relationship is not contractual. The City had a substantial level of
control over the behavior of Block. The City is a repository of information and the source of
guidance for developers as to site specific conditions that mayor could pose problems for a
developer. Block could not subdivide his property without the City's approval. Block could not
construct homes on his property without the City's approval. The City had knowledge of an
unreasonable risk of harm and the right and ability to control the party's conduct. Further, Block
participated in City-mandated process and heard and heeded the City's advice and counsel in
relation to his conduct.
The City had actual knowledge of the 1999 landslide evidenced principally by two
photographs and a memo placed in City records by the City Engineer and maintained by City
staff for the purpose of avoiding harm. Block reasonably relied on City staff s statements and
conduct in the preapplication meeting for SP8 and Canyon Greens subdivisions. The Subdivision
Ordinance requires the City to meet with developers and to guide them through the subdivision
process. See, Williams v. Thurston County, 997 P.2d 377 (Wash. App. Div. 22000) (A duty may
arise where a public official charged with the responsibility to provide accurate information fails
to correctly answer a specific inquiry from a plaintiff intended to benefit from the dissemination
of the information.) There exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether the City exercised
due care in actions as demonstrated in the depositions of Eric Hasenoehrl and Bud Van Stone
and the affidavit of John ("Hank") Swift. Mr. Hasenoehrl, a licensed civil engineer, testified that
a licensed engineer working for the City has an obligation to bring forward those things that have
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potential hann and to take action so that the infonnation is used and addressed in the future. R.
Vol. V, pp. 911-12. In addition, Mr. Van Stone, fonner City public works director, testified that
by failing to warn Block during the City's subdivision and/or building review processes the City
acted unreasonably and failed to exercise reasonable care because it is the City's duty to review
documents of record that are relevant to a subdivision or re-subdivision. R. Vol. V, p. 945.
Furthennore, Mr. Swift, a licensed civil engineer, testified that the City's failure to warn of the
1999 landslide contributed to the instability of the property and, ultimately, caused Block's
damage. R. Vol. IV, p. 701.

See, Rees v. State, Dept. ofHealth & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137 P.3d 397, 406
(2006) (There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ott and the Department exercised
due care in their investigation. Therefore, we conclude that under these circumstances the
Department and Ott owed to Tegan a duty to competently investigate the reported child abuse
because of the special relationship created once the report of suspected abuse was received.) In
Block's case, genuine issues of fact exist as to whether a special relationship existed between the
City and Block from which a duty of care arose.
Assumption of duty
Block has alleged facts sufficient to warrant a reasonable inference that the City assumed
a duty of care toward Block through its actions. This Court has recognized that it is possible to
create a duty where one previously did not exist. If one voluntarily undertakes to perfonn an act,
having no prior duty to do so, the duty arises to perfonn the act in a non-negligent manner.

Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793 P.2d 703, 705 (1990). "A duty arises
in the negligence context when one previously has undertaken to perfonn a primarily safetyrelated service; others are relying on the continued perfonnance of the service; and it is
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reasonably foreseeable that legally-recognized hann could result from failure to perfonn the
undertaking." Baccus v. Ameripride Services, Inc:., 145 Idaho 346, 351, 179 P.3d 309,314
(2008). See, Baccus, 145 Idaho at 352, 179 P.3d at 315 (Since AmeriPride assumed the duty of
placing mats at Bechtel for what was clearly a safety purpose and since the risk ofhann to third
parties was reasonably foreseeable, it is immaterial whether AmeriPride negligently perfonned
its duties in an affinnative way or whether it simply failed to perfonn its duties. Its conduct
would amount to negligence in either event.); Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 400,987 P.2d at 312
(Plaintiff alleged that the University was present to supervise Plaintiff, that the University knew
or should have known of hann from underage drinking, that the University knew or should have
known of Plaintiffs intoxication and that University should have acted before Plaintiffs injury.
Thus, the court found that Plaintiffs evidence supported an inference that the University
assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to safeguard plaintiff from acts of which University
employees had knowledge.)
Liberally construed, the factual record in this case supports inferences that the City
assumed a duty of care to the ultimate developer of the property in that the memorandum and
photographs relating to the 1999 landslide were placed by the then City Engineer, Mr. Richards,
into the City'S SP4 subdivision file and an "address file" in 1999 for the expressed purpose and
intent of ensuring that this hazardous site condition would be appropriately addressed at the time
of future development of the landslide area. The factual record supports the inferences that the
City was grossly negligent in 2005 and 2006 as part of the SP8 and Canyon Greens subdivision
review processes when members of City staff met with Block, and failed to retrieve and to notify
Block of this critical infonnation.
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Genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to Block's gross negligence claim.
The Idaho Tort Claim Act ("ITCA") at Idaho Code § 6-903 states:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, every governmental entity is
subject to liability for money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise
wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the course
and scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or
proprietary function, where the governmental entity if a private person or entity
would be liable for money damages under the laws of the state ofIdaho, provided
that the governmental entity is subject to liability only for the pro rata share of the
total damages awarded in favor of a claimant which is attributable to the negligent
or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions of the governmental entity or its
employees.
The purpose of the ITCA is to provide "much needed relief to those suffering injury from
the negligence of government employees." Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 214, 723 P.2d 755,
758 (1986). The ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent with its purpose, and with a view to
"attaining substantial justice." Id. at 214-15, 723 P.2d at 758-59. Therefore, under the ITCA
liability is the rule and immunity is the exception. Id.
Block has alleged that the City is subject to liability for money damages arising out of its
negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions and those of its employees acting within the
course and scope of their employment or duties. Block has set forth undisputed facts to support
his allegations.
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904B, "[a] governmental entity and its employees while
acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent
and without gross negligence or reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defmed in section 6904C, Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim which:
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate,
approval, order or similar authorization.
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4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an
inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of
the governmental entity performing the inspection.
Prior case law has not established that the gross negligence exception set forth above only
applies to a named defendant. See, Crown v. State, Dept. ofAgric., 127 Idaho 188, 192-93,898
P.2d 1099, 1103-04 (Ct. App. 1994) affd in part, rev'd in part, 127 Idaho 175,898 P.2d 1086
(1995) (Mr. Sparrow was not a named defendant, but the Growers argue that the evidence in the
record was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Mr. Sparrow
conducted his inspection of the Hawkins Warehouse "without gross negligence. "In its
memorandum decision, the trial court expressly found gross negligence on the part of Mr.
Sparrow to be lacking. After reviewing the record, including the deposition testimony of Mr.
Sparrow, we conclude that uncontroverted evidence sufficiently justified an inference that Mr.
Sparrow did not act, or omit to act, with deliberate indifference, and hence that he was not
grossly negligent as defined by I.e. § 6-904C. Accordingly, we uphold the district court's
finding that gross negligence did not exist in this case.") (emphasis added); Renzo v. Idaho State

Dept. ofAgr., 149 Idaho 777, 779,241 P.3d 950,952 (2010) (Renzo claimed that the Department
acted maliciously and/or recklessly, willfully and wantonly, and/or with gross negligence.)
(emphasis added); Cafferty v. State, Dept. ofTransp., Div. ofMotor Vehicle Services, 144 Idaho
324,327, 160 P.3d 763, 766 (2007) (After the accident, Camilla Cafferty filed a complaint
alleging gross negligence against the DMV.) (emphasis added).
To establish gross negligence under the ITCA, "there must be evidence showing not only
the breach of an obvious duty of care, but also showing deliberate indifference to the harmful
consequences to others." S. Griffin Const., Inc. v. City ofLewiston , 135 Idaho 181, 16 P.3d 278
(2000) (failure to inspect building prior to demolition could be considered grossly negligent
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given the lengthy amount of time that had passed prior to act of demolition, the condition of the
buildings after the fire, whether people were entering the buildings and whether defendant should
have known methods of construction of building). !d. at 190-91, 16 P.3d at 287-88.
Once a question of gross negligence is present, it is proper for the jury to decide it.
Hayslip v. George, 92 Idaho 349,442 P.2d 759 (1968); Smith v. Sharp, 85 Idaho 17,375 P.2d
184 (1962); Hansen v. Howard O. Miller, Inc., 93 Idaho 314, 317, 460 P.2d 739, 742 (1969). A
conflict in affidavits respecting issues of fact preclude summary judgment. Hansen v. Howard 0.
Miller, Inc., 93 Idaho 314, 317,460 P.2d 739, 742 (1969). Only in clear cases, that is to say,
where the facts are not in dispute and reasonable men can reasonably draw but one inference
from the facts, will the trial court pass on the question of negligence. All others should be
submitted to the jury.
The City's contention that this Court in Hoffer upheld dismissal of the claims because no
city employee was named as a party to the lawsuit is a misstatement. This Court in Hoffer
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Hoffer's claims of tortious interference with contract
and defamation under the ITCA on the alternative ground that the plain language of I.e. § 6904(3) exempts governmental entities from liability for tortious interference with contract rights
and defamation. Hoffer v. City ofBoise, 151 Idaho 400, 403, 257 P.3d 1226, 1229 (2011).
In this case, Block has named an individual defendant, Cutshaw. Block has previously set
forth numerous facts demonstrating that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the
City acted with gross negligence and sets forth the following additional facts related to Cutshaw.
•

Lowell Cutshaw testified that during his time as City Engineer he was not even aware
of the Tim Richards' memo from the SP4 files even though he was responsible for
engineering duties at the City during such time of that subdivision's approval. R. Vol.
III, p. 533.
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•

As City Engineer, Cutshaw had authority to require a soil stability analysis but failed
to do so on land slated for development at the site ofa previous landslide. R. Vol. III,
p.522.

•

Cutshaw testified that had he known of the information Mr. Richard placed in the file
of SP4 on the re-subdivisions of SP4 he would have required a geotechnical report. R.
Vol. III, p. 522.

•

Cutshaw testified that had he known of the Tim Richards' memo, he would have
required a geotechnical report be completed by Block. R. Vol. III, p. 522.

•

Cutshaw personally inspected the detention pond in disrepair. R. Vol. III, p. 523.

•

Cutshaw stated that had he had the 1999 Tim Richards information he could have
provided a recommendation regarding the use of the land. R. Vol. III, p. 527.

•

Cutshaw stated that at the building permit stage the City would have a duty to let
someone know about sensitive areas posed for development. R. Vol. III, p. 527.

•

Cutshaw was the City Engineer and approved the Administrative Plat of Canyon
Greens. R. Vol. III, p. 541.

The City does not have immunity under Idaho Code § 6-904(1).
Idaho Code § 6-904 states, in part, that a "governmental entity and its employees while
acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent
shall not be liable for any claim which:
1. Arises out of any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity
exercising ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a
statutory or regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid,
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused ....
Pursuant to this test, discretionary or planning functions of government are exempt from
liability in tort, whereas operational functions conducted without "ordinary care" do not give rise
to governmental immunity. I.C. § 6-904(1). Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co.,
Inc., 112 Idaho 423, 425, 732 P.2d 661,663 (1986). Decisions made under statutes and
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regulations which leave room for policy judgment in their execution are discretionary. !d.
However, when the plaintiff alleges that a government official has negligently acted in not
complying with the policy constituted in a statute, regulation, or court order, then there is no
immunity. Sterlingv. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 231,723 P.2d 755,775 (1986).
To determine if a governmental action qualifies as a discretionary function, the Court
uses the "planning/operational" test first adopted in Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d
755 (1986). Under this standard, "[r]outine matters not requiring evaluation of broad policy
factors will likely be 'operational,' whereas decisions involving a consideration of the fmancial,
political, economic, and social effects of a particular plan are likely 'discretionary' and will be
accorded immunity." Tomich v. City ofPocatello, 127 Idaho 394, 397, 901 P.2d 501, 504 (1995).
Under the discretionary function prong, a governmental entity is entitled to absolute immunity
regarding claims arising from the performance of a "discretionary function." However, under the
operational prong a government entity can be liable if it fails to exercise ordinary care in
implementing a pre-established policy. Lawton v. City ofPocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 460, 886
P.2d 330, 336 (1994).
The situation in Lawton is similar to that in Block's case. In Lawton, the challenged
conduct was the decision not to use a raised median at the site of the accident. The court
determined that this determination involved the routine implementation of the City's predetermined policies. Since it did not involve basic policy considerations, this court concluded
that the decision was not a discretionary function within the meaning ofLC. § 6-904(1). Lawton

v. City ofPocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 461,886 P.2d 330,337 (1994). In Block's situation, the City
had codified pre-determined policies in the City Subdivision Ordinance, and the routine
implementation of these policies is not a discretionary function entitled to immunity. The
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discretionary-function exception does not apply when a statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action that the government employee must follow. See Ignatiev v. United
States, 238 F3d 464, 467 (DC Cir 2001) (internal policy guidelines); Miles v. Naval Aviation
Museum Found., Inc., 289 F3d 715,722 (11 th Cir 2002) (federal regulations).
The facts in this record, at the very least, raise a genuine issue as to whether City staff,
including its engineer Cutshaw, exercised ordinary care in the performance of their function(s)
under City Subdivision Code Ordinance Sections 32-8 and/or 32-9. Here, the City, which
maintains subdivision files as part of its routine, day to day, operations, failed to include critical
site information in its then pending Canyon Greens subdivision application file and also failed to
search or cross-reference Canyon Greens' predecessor subdivision files, SP4 and SP8, all the
while being charged with operational responsibility under the City Subdivision Ordinance to
meet with Block at a preapplication conference, to inspect the site, to identify any unusual
problems and review and discuss with Block the potential need for a slope stability study to
address site conditions. These rudimentary tasks, prescribed by this ordinance, were performed
absent the exercise of ordinary care. Again, at the very least, material issues of fact exist as to
this issue.
Even when a statute or regulation permits the exercise of choice at an operational level
that is based on the same policies as that statute or regulation, there is a presumption that the
discretionary immunity defense shields the conduct from liability. This presumption may be
overcome, however, by a showing that safety concerns were not adequately considered. See, e.g.,
George v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 1524, 1533 (MD Ala. 1990) (Forest Service did not have
discretion to decide whether policy considerations of protecting alligators and their natural
surroundings outweighed safety of persons using designated swimming area); ARA Leisure
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Services v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1987) (failure to maintain safety of road is
not discretionary when conduct involves safety considerations under established policy rather
than competing public policy considerations).
Block contends that the City is not entitled to discretionary immunity for the mandated
implementation of its Subdivision Code. The preapplication process is perfunctory, a routine
task, and not a planning activity. Even if implementation of the Subdivision Code were
considered discretionary - then such an action is not entitled to immunity because the obvious
safety concerns arising from development and construction on the site of a landslide were not
considered and certainly outweigh other policy concerns.
The City does not have immunity under Idaho Code § 6-904(7).
The City contends that the exception to liability provided by paragraph 7 of Idaho Code
section 6-904 applies to the City's issuance of subdivision plats because the subdivision plats
contained easements dedicated to the City. Respondent's Brief at 40.
Idaho Code § 6-904 states, in part, that a "governmental entity and its employees while
acting within the course and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent
shall not be liable for any claim which:
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways,
roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in
effect at the time of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of
the construction by the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some
other body or administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give
such approval.
The focus of the immunity is on the claim at issue. Block's claim in this regard is that the
City had a duty to him during the preapplication and subdivision platting process. Block's claim
does not arise out of a subdivision plat or other plan or design for construction of improvement
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to public property. Block's claim has nothing to do with the plat itself. To the contrary, had the
City exercised ordinary care in the preapplication meeting and subdivision platting process there
either would have been no plat or the plat would have been prepared in a manner that would have
abated or mitigated the deleterious effects of the site condition that rendered Canyon Greens
subdivision unsuitable for development. The district court's liberal and overly-broad application
of this exception to liability is in error.
The Economic Loss Rule was erroneously applied by the District Court.
The City continues to contend it owed no duty to Block because the economic loss rule
prohibits recovery of purely economic losses in a negligence action. Respondent's Brief at 14.
What the City continually fails to acknowledge is obvious - Block did not suffer purely
economic loss and, as a consequence, the economic loss rule does not apply to Block's case. The
City conflates the issue by stating "Block is trying to recover his contractual expectation
damages against the City and Cutshaw under a negligence claim." Respondent's Brief at 15. It is
unclear what the City is asserting by this statement. At no time did Block enter into a contract
with the City; Block did not have any contractual expectations with the City because he had no
contract with the City.
The land Block purchased from Streibick would be considered "transactional property,"
as that term has been applied by the Idaho Supreme Court in cases invoking the economic loss
doctrine, in a suit between Block and Streibick, but it is not transactional property in the suit
between Block and the City because no "transaction" occurred between Block and the City. As
this court discussed in Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 244 P.3d
166 (2010), plaintiffs [Taco Time] purchased a used neon sign (a "transaction") that was
defective and employed defendant to install it. Before installing the sign, defendant failed to
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check whether the sign complied with code requirements. The sign caused a fire that destroyed
Taco Time's restaurant. The trial court dismissed the claim on the ground that the claim was
barred by the economic loss rule because the "defective property", the sign, caused the fire. This
court reversed, noting that plaintiff could recover for defendant's negligence in connecting the
sign and stating "there was no defective property which was the subject of the transaction
[because] Taco Time did not purchase those items from [defendant]." Id. at 26 & n.3, 244 P.3d at
170 & n.3.
The district court in the case at bar made the same error. It held - as did the court in Brian
& Christie - that property (the sign in Brian & Christie and a parcel ofland in this case) - was

transactional property despite the fact that the City did not sell the defective land to Block. Just
as in Brian & Christie, the City had a duty (and an opportunity) to prevent the "non-economic"
losses Block incurred building three (3) beautiful custom homes after obtaining subdivision
approval and building permits the City had negligently and gross negligently provided to him.
The City is correct that Block's damages would be characterized as expectation damages

ifthere had been a contract between Block and City for the sale of the land. But there was no
such contract. The fact that the measure of Block's loss as a result of the City's breach of duty in
negligence and gross negligence is the loss of the value of the land and its improvements does
not transmute that loss into a contract claim: Block did not have a contractual relationship with
either the City or its engineer. If A purchases a piece of property and builds a house on it
intending to sell it, and A's neighbor negligently fails to keep control of a fire and it destroys the
house. A's loss is legally indistinguishable from Block's. Neither can accurately be characterized
as "contractual expectation damages" because there was no contractual relationship between A
and her neighbor.

APPELLANT' S REPLY BRIEF - 23

The City is also incorrect when it claims that the purpose of the economic loss rule is "to
prevent parties from seeking contract damages under torts claims." This is a misstatement of the
economic loss rule. The foundational case for this branch of the doctrine is Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). Clark had purchased a tractor that failed to
meet his needs. Rather than suing for breach of purchase contract, however, he sued in
negligence. This court held that a disappointed buyer cannot abandon his contract claim against
the seller and seek instead to recover under torts. As the court wrote,
The law of negligence requires the defendant to exercise due care to build a tractor
that does not harm person or property .... [T]he law of negligence does not impose
on International Harvester a duty to build a tractor that plows fast enough and
breaks down infrequently enough for Clark to make a profit in his custom farming
business. This is not to say that such a duty could not arise by a warranty -- express
or implied -- by agreement of the parties or by representations of the defendant, but
the law of negligence imposes no such duty.
Id. at 336,581 P.2d at 794. Since there was no contract between Block and the City there is no
concern with "contract law drowning in a sea oftort." East River Steamship Corp. v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (evaluating the various state positions on
the line between tort and contract when the claim is for a defective product and adopting the
position this court announced in Clark).
The City seeks to circumvent the definition of transactional property discussed in Brian
& Christie by pointing to Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002,895 P.2d

1195 (1995), in which the court applied the economic loss rule despite the absence ofa contract
between the plaintiff and defendant. The City fails to note that this court has described Duffin as
an exception to the general rule because the defendant was an entity that "held itself out to the
public as having expertise regarding a specialized function, and by so doing, inducer d] reliance
on that its performance of that function." See Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296,
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301, 108 P.3d 996, 1001 (2005). The Court of Appeals has noted that "the Supreme Court
explained in its holding that this principle applies only to an 'extremely limited group of cases. ",
Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 Idaho 702, 710-11, 99 P.3d 1092, 1100-01 (2004). The

City seeks to have an exception swallow the general rule that a contract for the sale of the
defective property must exist between the parties before the economic loss rule applies to
subsequent damage to the property.
Block did not suffer and is not seeking to recover from purely economic losses as a result
of the City's negligence. Therefore, since this case does not involve "pure" economic loss,
Block's parasitic economic loss caused by the City's breach of duty in negligence is recoverable.
See, e.g., Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Electric, Inc., 150 Idaho 22, 28, 244 P.3d 166, 172
(2010); Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007,895 P.2d 1195, 1200
(1995); Just's v. Arrington Construction Co., 99 Idaho 462, 469 n.l, 583 P.2d 997, 1004 n.1

(1978).
Any citation by the City to Duffin as being analogous to Block's situation is erroneous.
The economic loss rule applied in Duffin because the Duffins suffered purely economic losses.
Duffin involved the sale of certified seed potatoes subject to statutory regulation. Duffin, 126

Idaho at 1004, 895 P.2d at 1197. The Duffins agreed to purchase seed potatoes that were
inspected by the State ofIdaho, Department of Agriculture, Federal-State Inspection Service
("FSIS").Id. at 1005,895 P.2d at 1198. Potatoes grown by the Duffins from the seed potatoes

were infected with bacterial ring rot ("BRR"). BRR results in reduced yields and, once potatoes
are infected, their storage time is reduced. Id. The Duffins claimed the seed potatoes were
infected when they received them and, as a result, they suffered substantial losses. "The losses
claimed consisted of (1) the excess of the price paid for the seed [potatoes] because [they were]
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'certified;' (2) lost revenues which resulted from reduced yields; and (3) lost revenues which
resulted from having to sell the crop immediately upon harvest, rather than by way of more
lucrative contracts the Duffins had already negotiated, or by waiting until the open market prices
were higher." Id. Based on market prices prevailing at the time when the Duffins would have
marketed their crop, they estimate they lost $314,418.80 due to the fact that they had to sell
earlier than anticipated. Id.
The Duffins sought to recover for purely economic losses, recoupment of price paid for a
product and lost profits, in their negligence action against FSIS. The Duffins sought to recover
damages from FSIS for negligence and negligent misrepresentation in the inspection and
certification of the seed. Id. at 1005-06, 895 P.2d 1195, 1198-99 (1995). FSIS moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the Duffins' negligence claims were barred because
purely economic loss cannot be recovered in tort. The district court agreed and granted both

motions.ld. at 1006,895 P.2d at 1199. This court affirmed.
The product in Duffin did not perform as expected. The product did not produce as many
potatoes as the Duffins expected and those potatoes that were produced could not be stored as
long as the Duffins expected. These facts are inapposite to the circumstances that resulted in
Block's damages. The bare land Block purchased was defective. The City knew of such defect.
The City had a duty to inform Block of that defect and failed to do so. Block constructed
extensive improvements on the bare land, these extensive improvements were damaged and lost
when the concealed defect in the property became apparent. Block's case against the City has
nothing to do with contractual expectations. The bare land did not produce three (3) houses. The
bare land did not produce three (3) houses of a different quality than Block expected. Block's
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losses in this case are the more than one million dollars from his own pocket that he invested
after the City had grossly breached its duty to him. The City's reliance on Duffin is misplaced.
Block did suffer property damage to other property.
Block did suffer property damage other than to the real property he purchased from Streibick.
The economic loss rule is clearly inapplicable on this basis as well. Block's situation is analogous
to that of the plaintiff in Oppenheimer. In Oppenheimer Indus., Inc. v. Johnson Cattle Co., 112
Idaho 423, 732 P.2d 661 (1986), the plaintiff claimed that negligence on the part of the State
Brand Board resulted in the theft of its cattle. This Court took a literal view of the term "property
loss" and allowed the plaintiff to recover. In distinguishing Clark, this Court held that, "[u]nlike
the plaintiff in Clark, Oppenheimer is not still in possession of defective goods. Rather,
Oppenheimer has suffered the loss of its property (i.e. the cattle) .... " !d. at 426, 732 P.2d at 664
(emphasis in original). Thus, "property loss" was equated with a loss of physical possession of
one's property, even if that property was the subject of the transaction.
This Court has explained what is NOT property loss. In Duffin, this Court stated that
"[a]lthough the existence ofBRR in the seed may have resulted in a reduced crop yield, terming
this loss a 'property loss' would be the same as saying that the plaintiff in Clark suffered a
property loss because the use of his defective tractor also resulted in reduced crop yields." See

also G & M Farms v. FunkIrrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 527, 808 P.2d 851, 864 (1991) (a
reduced crop yield resulting from the use of an inadequate irrigation system is not a property
loss).
Block clearly suffered injury and destruction to tangible property caused by an
occurrence.
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The City is not entitled to an award of costs and/or fees on appeal.
Under Idaho Code § 12-117(1), "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute, in any
proceeding involving as adverse parties a ... political subdivision and a person, ... the court
hearing the proceeding, including on appeal, shall award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it [mds that the nonprevailing
party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law."
Under Idaho Code § 6-918A, "reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the claimant,
the governmental entity or the employee of such governmental entity, as costs, in actions under
this act, upon petition therefor and a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party
against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad faith in the commencement,
conduct, maintenance or defense of the action.... The right to recover attorney fees in legal
actions for money damages that come within the purview of this act shall be governed
exclusively by the provisions of this act and not by any other statute or rule of court, except as
may be hereafter expressly and specifically provided or authorized by duly enacted statute of the
state of Idaho." (emphasis added).
In Tomich v. City 0/Pocatello, 127 Idaho 394,400,901 P.2d 501,507 (1995), this Court
explained that the legislature added § 6-918A to the !TCA two years after the enactment of I.e.
§ 12-121. This Court stated "[t]o the extent of any conflict between I.e. § 12-121 and I.C. § 6918A, we apply I.C. § 6-918A.1t is not only the later statute, but also a more specific statement
of the legislature's intent about the award of attorney fees in tort claims cases." Id. citing

Mickelsen v. City o/Rexburg, 101 Idaho 305, 307, 612 P.2d 542, 544 (1980) (holding that to the
extent of conflicts, later or more specific statutes control over earlier or general statutes). See

also Beehler v. Fremont County, 145 Idaho 656, 661, 182 P.3d 713, 718 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The
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Respondents request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 6-918A or I.e. § 12-117. Section
6-918A is the exclusive provision for awarding attorney fees under the ITCA, including claims
on appeaL") Although this Court in Brown v. City ofPocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 811, 229 P .3d
1164, 1173 (2010), stated that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney
fees for the entities to which it applies, it is unclear whether this Court considered the appeal
from an award of summary judgment granted to the City of Pocatello on plaintiff's claims of
nuisance and inverse condemnation, as falling under the ITCA and the associated attorney fee
provision in I.e. § 6-918A, because plaintiff's ITCA notice and claim was solely for negligence.
Block contends that Idaho Code §6-918A is the appropriate statute to be considered in
this instance.
The City argues that because Block presents no new facts or law to this Court, there is no
basis for Block's appeal and therefore this appeal "is in bad faith". Respondent's Brief at 44.
This Court has defined bad faith as "dishonesty in belief or purpose." Cordova v. Bonneville
Cnty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 643, 167 P.3d 774, 780 (2007) (citing Cobbley v.
Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 135, 139 P.3d 732, 737 (2006)). The City has not directed this Court to
an instance of dishonesty in belief or purpose on the part of Block. Thus, no attorney fees or
costs should be awarded to the City on this appeal. See Renzo v. Idaho State Dept. ofAgr., 149
Idaho 777, 781-82, 241 P.3d 950, 954-55 (2010) ("This Court does not award attorney fees and
costs to the Department pursuant to I.C. § 6--918A. The Department has not directed this Court
to an instance of dishonesty in belief or purpose on the part of Plaintiff. Moreover, while Plaintiff
may have asked this Court to second-guess the findings of the trial court, the Department has not
provided authority or argument demonstrating how such action was dishonest or made in bad
faith.")
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Conclusion
Based on briefing and the record, Block requests that this Court reverse the district
court's grant of summary judgment in this case and remand this case, with proper instruction, to
the district court for a trial on the merits. Block also respectfully requests that this Court deny the
City's request for attorney fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of March, 2013.
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